Catholic University Law Review
Volume 62
Issue 4 Summer 2013

Article 1

2014

Amending the Economic Espionage Act to Require the Disclosure
of National Security-Related Technology Thefts
David Orozco

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the National Security
Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David Orozco, Amending the Economic Espionage Act to Require the Disclosure of National SecurityRelated Technology Thefts, 62 Cath. U. L. Rev. 877 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol62/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

Amending the Economic Espionage Act to Require the Disclosure of National
Security-Related Technology Thefts
Cover Page Footnote
Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, The College of Business, Florida State University, dorozco@fsu.edu.
The author appreciates the feedback received at the Florida State University’s Center for Insurance
Research, and the Academy of Legal Studies in Business 2012 Annual Conference.

This article is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol62/iss4/1

AMENDING THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT TO
REQUIRE THE DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL
SECURITY-RELATED TECHNOLOGY THEFTS
David Orozco+
I. TRADE SECRET LAW AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
TRADE SECRETS AND NATIONAL SECURITY........................................ 882
A. Regulation of Trade Secrets and Protection Against
Trade Secret Misappropriation ..................................................... 884
1. Federal Law ............................................................................. 884
a. The Economic Espionage Act ......................................... 884
b. The International Trade Commission and
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 ............................ 885
c. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ................................ 886
2. State Law .................................................................................. 887
3. Private Protection of Trade Secrets ......................................... 890
B. National Security Implications ........................................................ 890
II. THE CHALLENGES OF ENFORCING TRADE SECRET
MISAPPROPRIATION LAWS .................................................................. 892
A. Under-Enforcement ......................................................................... 892
B. Market Failures ............................................................................... 895
1. Cross-Border Enforcement Costs............................................. 895
2. Reputational Costs ................................................................... 896
3. Inadequate IT and Compliance Capabilities ........................... 897
C. Agency-Related Legal Impediments ................................................ 898
1. Inadequate Protection of Whistleblowers ................................ 898
2. Ineffective Corporate Fiduciary Law ....................................... 900
a. The Business Judgment Rule and Trade Secret
Misappropriation .......................................................... 900
b. The Oversight Doctrine and Trade Secret
Misappropriation .......................................................... 902
III. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AMENDING THE ECONOMIC
ESPIONAGE ACT .................................................................................. 904
A. Protection of the Public Interest ...................................................... 904
B. Protection of Critical Technologies with a Unified
National Policy ............................................................................. 906
C. Expansion of Protection for Explicit Knowledge ............................ 906
+
Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, The College of Business, Florida State University,
dorozco@fsu.edu. The author appreciates the feedback received at the Florida State University’s
Center for Insurance Research, and the Academy of Legal Studies in Business 2012 Annual
Conference.

877

878

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 62:877

IV. AMENDING THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT TO REQUIRE
DISCLOSURE OF TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION IN
CASES INVOLVING NATIONAL SECURITY ............................................ 908
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 911
Emerging trends indicate that the pace of economic espionage and
trade secret theft against U.S. corporations is accelerating. There
appears to be multiple vectors of attack for persons and governments
seeking to steal trade secrets. Foreign competitors of U.S.
corporations, some with ties to foreign governments, have increased
their efforts to steal trade secret information through the recruitment
of current or former employees. Additionally, there are indications
that U.S. companies, law firms, academia, and financial institutions
are experiencing cyber intrusion activity against electronic
repositories containing trade secret information. Trade secret theft
threatens American businesses, undermines national security, and
places the security of the U.S. economy in jeopardy. These acts also
diminish U.S. export prospects around the globe and put American
jobs at risk.
As an Administration, we are committed to continuing to be
vigilant in addressing threats—including corporate and state
sponsored trade secret misappropriation—that jeopardize our status
as the world’s leader for innovation and creativity.1
The White House issued this statement regarding its strategy to combat trade
secret theft in February of 2013.2 This new strategy emphasizes the growing
Recently, private
problem of foreign state-sponsored data breaches.3
companies and government agencies—ranging from Google to the U.S.

1. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON MITIGATING
THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 1-2 (2013) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY],
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on
_mitigating_the_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf.
2. Id. The White House issued this strategy report in tandem with a recent executive order
promulgated on February 12, 2013. See Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,739-41
(Feb. 19, 2013) (envisioning greater protection of trade secrets from foreign and domestic theft by
(1) mandating that federal agencies inform American companies of known cyber security threats,
and (2) coordinating with the National Institutes of Standards and Technology to impose stricter
standards and better procedures to protect companies from cyber attacks).
3. See OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING
U.S. ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE i (2011) [hereinafter ONCIX REPORT], available at
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf
(“Foreign economic collection and industrial espionage against the United States represent
significant and growing threats to the nation’s prosperity and security.”).
THE
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Chamber of Commerce—have reported network breaches by overseas entities
seeking to gain access to strategic information.4
The increasing vulnerability of domestic networks to state-sponsored groups
underscores the related problem of trade secret theft committed by foreign
actors.5 Overseas-based trade secret theft poses increasing financial and
security risks to the United States.6 Although measuring specific loss is almost
impossible, trade secret theft costs the United States between two and four
hundred billion dollars annually.7 Despite its financial significance, trade
secret theft goes largely unnoticed because it is widely under-reported.8 The
various laws in place to protect trade secrets are ineffective due to the
unavailability of a private cause of action, which impedes enforcement.9

4. See Siobhan Gorman, China Hackers Hit U.S. Chamber, WALL ST. J., (Dec. 21, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204058404577110541568535300.html
(reporting a cyber attack on the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s computer network, resulting in the
theft of “everything stored on its systems”); John Markoff, Hackers Said to Breach Google
Password System, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 2012, at A1, A3 (reporting that Chinese hackers stole
Google’s intellectual property and compromised the email accounts of two human rights activists
in China). As a result of the breach of its password system, Google announced on its security
blog that it would alert users if the company suspected that a cyber attack had compromised any
of its users’ Gmail accounts. Eric Grosse, Security Warnings for Suspected State-Sponsored
(June
5,
2012,
12:04
PM),
Attacks,
GOOGLE ONLINE SECURITY BLOG
http://google/onlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2012/06/security-warnings-for-suspected-state.html.
According to Google’s Vice President of Security Engineering,
[w]e are constantly on the lookout for malicious activity on our systems, in particular
attempts by third parties to log into users’ accounts unauthorized. When we have
specific intelligence—either directly from users or from our own monitoring efforts
—we show clear warning signs and put in place extra roadblocks to thwart these bad
actors.
Today, we’re taking that a step further for a subset of our users, who we believe may be
the target of state-sponsored attacks. . . .
You might ask how we know this activity is state-sponsored. We can’t go into the
details without giving away information that would be helpful to these bad actors, but
our detailed analysis—as well as victim reports—strongly suggest the involvement of
states or groups that are state-sponsored.
Id.
5. Google, for example, alleged that Chinese government-sponsored agents were
responsible for the 2010 attack on its network. See Gorman, supra note 4; Markoff, supra note 4,
at A1.
6. ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 1; ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 3.
7. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 3–4.
8. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that, even if a company is aware that its
trade secrets have been stolen, it may choose not to report the theft because of concerns for its
reputation).
9. Michael L. Rustad, The Negligent Enablement of Trade Secret Misappropriation, 22
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 455, 474 (2006) (“Trade secret protection is the
only branch of intellectual property [for which] there is not a private cause of action based upon
federal statute.”).
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To complicate matters, foreign, state-sponsored actors commit trade secret
theft using increasingly sophisticated data collection techniques.10 Some
actors actively target technologies that directly affect national security.11
Digital information, cultural attitudes favoring open access to information and
transparency, use of the Internet and mobile devices to communicate sensitive
information, and the outsourcing and globalization of business all contribute to
the increase of both domestic and foreign trade secret theft.12
Given the serious risk and greater frequency of data breaches, policymakers
have begun to take on a more active regulatory and oversight role. For
example, U.S. Senator Joe Lieberman proposed legislation to protect critical
infrastructure from a cyber warfare attack.13 Similarly, Congress recently
approved increased criminal penalties for trade secret theft.14 Finally, in 2011,
U.S. Senator Chris Coons and former U.S. Senator Herb Kohl proposed
additional legislation to provide a federal private cause of action for companies
harmed by trade secret theft.15

10. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 5–6 (providing examples of China’s and Russia’s
sophisticated data-hacking programs).
11. See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 4 (explaining that Chamber of Commerce breach was the
latest in a series of economic espionage originating from China and threatening national security).
12. See James H.A. Pooley, Mark A. Lemley & Peter J. Toren, Understanding the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177, 178 (1997) (“Outsourcing,
collaborative engineering, and the virtual corporation have substantially increased the risk of loss
through both inadvertence and espionage”); Nicole Pelroth, Traveling Light in a Time of Digital
Thievery, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2012, at A1 (explaining that trade secret theft is no longer “the
work of insiders or disgruntled employees” because “it has become easier to steal information
because of the Internet, the proliferation of smartphones and the inclination of employees to plug
their personal devices into workplace networks and cart proprietary information around”).
13. See Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S.3414, 112th Cong. (2012). The Senate rejected the
bill on August 2, 2012 after a failed vote for cloture. 158 CONG. REC. S5,919 (daily ed. Aug. 2,
2012). Senator Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia revived the effort by introducing the
Cybersecurity Act of 2013 in July of 2013. See 159 CONG. REC. S5,909 (daily ed. July 24, 2013)
(introducing the Cybersecurity Act of 2013, S.1353, 113th Cong. (2013)). The bill was referred
to the Committee on Science, Commerce, and Transportation for consideration on July 24, 2013.
159 CONG. REC. S5,907 (daily ed. July 24, 2013).
14. See Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-269, 126 Stat. 2442 (increasing the monetary penalties under the Economic Espionage Act
(EEA) from a maximum of $500,000 to a maximum of $5 million for individual offenders, and
from a maximum of $10 million to a maximum of the “greater of $10,000,000 or 3 times the
value of the stolen trade secret to the organization, including expenses for research and design”
for an organizational offender).
15. See 157 CONG. REC. S6,229-30 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 2011) (introducing Senate Amendment
729, which would have amended the Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011 to
provide for a private cause of action for trade secret theft); Press Release, Senator Coons
Introduces Two Amendments to Currency Bill to Protect American Intellectual Property (Oct. 5,
2011), http://www.coons.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/release/senator-coons-introduces-two
-amendments-to-currency-bill-to-protect-american-intellectual-property (describing legislation
that would create “a single, uniform, nationwide cause of action” allowing private companies to
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Furthermore, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive
(ONCIX), which coordinates with several agencies and branches of
government to track the impact of industrial espionage on American
competitiveness and security,16 reported to Congress that trade secret theft
through cyber technology “represent[s] significant and growing threats to the
ONCIX’s findings reinforce the
nation’s prosperity and security.”17
government’s interest in cyber security and emphasize the need for the recently
proposed and enacted legislation.
Defense-related technologies are a prime target for trade secret theft. For
example, the Department of Defense (DOD) conducts approximately $400
billion in business with private defense contractors annually, which provides
access to and allows contractors to collect and maintain sensitive information
and intellectual property.18 Consequently, the DOD requires contractors to file
suspicious contact reports whenever they encounter activity that signals a
possible threat.19 However, although private contractors working with the
DOD are frequently targeted, only ten percent of contractors actually file
reports when they detect suspicious activity.20 This scenario is troubling
because if trade secret theft victims fail to report the crime, regulatory laws
will not be enforced and harmful activity will not be deterred.21
To ameliorate the harmful effects of the under-enforcement of trade-secret
theft penalties and network vulnerabilities, this Article proposes an amendment
to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA), a federal statute that
criminalizes industrial espionage and trade secret theft.22 The proposed
“sue for trade-secret theft in federal court”). The amendment was tabled. 157 CONG. REC.
S6,227 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 2011).
16. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at iii–iv (noting that, to create the report, ONCIX
collaborated with “the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), Army
Counterintelligence Center (ACIC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), Defense Security Service (DSS), Department of Energy (DoE), Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of State (DoS), Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO),
National Security Agency, and Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS),” among others).
17. Id. at i (indicating that the use of “[c]yberspace” in business “amplifies these threats by
making it possible for malicious actors, whether they are corrupted insiders or foreign intelligence
services (FIS), to quickly steal and transfer massive quantities of stat while remaining anonymous
and hard to detect.”).
18. Id. at A-1.
19. Id.
20. Id. (observing that defense contractors generally do not report trade secret theft unless
the theft affects a contract with the Pentagon, largely because “reporting procedures are often
cumbersome and redundant”).
21. See George Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 530–31
(1970) (arguing that, in order to achieve the optimal number of offenses, “rational [law]
enforcement” must have “expected penalties increasing with expected gains so there is no
marginal net gain from larger offenses”).
22. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2006 & Supp. 2012)). A prior work proposed amending the EEA to mandate
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amendment to the EEA seeks to make two changes to the existing law. First,
the proposed amendment imposes both civil and criminal penalties for the
failure to report trade secret theft involving technology restricted by export
control laws. Second, the proposed amendment establishes a whistleblower
defense to encourage parties to report suspected trade secret thefts or violations
of the duty to disclose.
Part I of the Article discusses the federal and state laws that protect trade
secrets and the nexus between trade secrets and national security. Part II
demonstrates that the existing laws are largely unsuccessful in preventing,
deterring, or remedying trade secret theft against U.S. companies. Part II also
examines the tension between the duty to preserve confidential information
under agency law and the immunity granted to officers and directors under the
fiduciary oversight doctrine developed by the Delaware courts. Part III
discusses the policy justifications for amending the EEA to impose an
affirmative duty to report suspected trade secret thefts. Finally, Part IV
discusses the proposed amendment to the EEA and the expected positive
impact that this change will have on trade secret management practices.
I. TRADE SECRET LAW AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE SECRETS
AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Trade secrets are a form of intellectual property23 that dates to the Middle
Ages.24 The term “trade secret” encompasses a broad spectrum of information
that can include customer lists,25 technical data,26 recipes,27 and methods of
affirmative disclosures as a measure to preserve national security. Aaron J. Burstein, Trade
Secrecy as an Instrument of National Security? Rethinking the Foundations of Economic
Espionage, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 933 (2009). Burstein’s article, in contrast to the instant work, does
not address the specific changes to the EEA and the enforcement mechanics required to safeguard
national security. Id. at 982 (“For example, policymakers would need to decide upon triggers for
breach reporting, the appropriate recipient(s) of reports, penalties for failing to comply with
reporting requirements, and an agenda for using breach reports. Discussing these details is beyond
the scope of this Article.”).
23. Trade secrets are quasi-property in the sense that the law punishes misappropriation of
the trade secret, but it does not provide relief in cases involving the independent derivation of the
secret—such as by reverse engineering—if the information was not misappropriated. C.f. 1
ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.01[2], 2–11 (2001) (explaining that “the
possessor of a trade secret has a property right in [the information] that permits the possessor to
restrict use and disclosure of it in many situations.”).
24. See Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open Source Software: Informal
Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation 5 (Nov. 13, 2004) (working paper), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=661543 (noting that medieval guilds
“protected investments in training new members . . . which is a human capital formation function
typically associated with modern ‘trade secret’ law”).
25. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-74-102(4) (2012) (defining a “trade secret” to include a
“listing of names, addresses, or telephone numbers, or other information relating to any business
or profession which is secret and of value”).
26. See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1986) (defining a “trade secret” to include
a “program”).
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conducting business.28 Trade secrets can be critical intangible assets in a
knowledge-based economy.29 Companies expend considerable resources to
generate and protect trade secrets,30 especially information that is valuable,
rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN).31 A VRIN resource has the
potential to generate long-term and sustainable competitive advantage for
companies.32
Theft of a company’s trade secrets can occur in two ways: (1) inbound trade
secret theft, and (2) outbound trade secret theft.33 Inbound trade secret theft
occurs when trade secrets are brought into a company, with or without the
company’s knowledge.34 Outbound trade secret theft, conversely, occurs when
a company’s own trade secrets leave the company without its consent.35 This
Article is primarily concerned with imposing an affirmative duty to disclose
outbound trade secret theft.

27. See, e.g., id. (defining a “trade secret” to include a “formula,” “method,” or “process”);
William Neuman, A Man With Muffin Secrets, But No Job to Go With Them, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
2010, at A1, A3 (describing the trade secret claim Bimbo Bakeries USA—the owner of Thomas’
English muffins—filed against a former employee, which alleged that the employee stole the
company’s secret “nooks and crannies” recipe).
28. See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (defining a “trade secret” to include a
“method” or “process”); Complaint para. 81, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. v.
Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 09 Civ. 2862 (SCR) (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2010), 2009 WL 1025597
(alleging trade secret misappropriation by former employees of Starwood Hotels who stole
several business materials, including Strategic Plans, “Brand Bibles,” and “‘Property
Improvement Plans,’” or templates “for how to create the ‘the Ultimate W Experience’ in
conversion properties, providing step-by-step details for how to convert a hotel property to a W
branded hotel.”) Starwood Hotels survived a motion to dismiss. Starwood Hotels & Resorts
Worldwide, Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 09 Civ. 2862 (SCR), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71436,
at *26 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2010).
29. David J. Teece, Gary Pisano & Amy Shuen, Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic
Management, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 509, 516–17 (1997).
30. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 28, at paras. 46–51 (describing the measure Starwood
Hotels took to protect its business methods and processes, such as requiring employees to sign
confidentiality agreements and certify compliance with the terms annually, securing networks and
computers, allowing remote access to the company’s information only through a password
protected system, and marking confidential documents).
31. See Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory To
Determine Covenant Not To Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979, 1009 (2012) (describing how
businesses establish a legitimate business interest in non-compete cases through the ownership of
a knowledge-based asset with VRIN properties); see also Jay Barney, Firm Resources and
Sustained Competitive Advantage, 17 J. MGMT. 99, 105–07 (1991) (considered the seminal work
on the resource-based theory of business strategy).
32. Barney, supra note 31.
33. See James Pooley & Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Trade Secrets and Corporate
Governance: Best Practices, IPO LAW JOURNAL—TRADE SECRETS SECTION (Nov. 10, 2005), at
1-2, http://www.ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/TS_CorporateGovernance.pdf.
34. See id. at 2.
35. See id.
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A. Regulation of Trade Secrets and Protection Against Trade Secret
Misappropriation
1. Federal Law
a. The Economic Espionage Act
The EEA was enacted in 1996 as a response to the rising economic value of
information, the lack of adequate federal criminal sanctions, and the inability
of state criminal laws to deter trade secret theft.36 The EEA was also meant to
address the rise in post-Cold War, state-sponsored industrial espionage.37 The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimated that, at the time the EEA was
enacted, nearly twenty-five countries had developed methods by which to
illegally acquire the United States’ industrial secrets.38
Under the EEA, a “trade secret” encompasses “all forms and types of
financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering
This type of information includes “patterns, plans,
information.”39
compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods,
techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically,
graphically, photographically, or in writing.”40 This information only qualifies
as a trade secret if “(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to
keep such information secret; and (B) the information derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the public.”41
The EEA criminalizes misappropriation of information that meets the
statutory criteria of a trade secret.42 The EEA prohibits both the theft of trade
secrets, undertaken by either domestic or foreign actors,43 as well as industrial
espionage committed for the benefit of foreign state actors.44 Although the
EEA authorizes the Department of Justice (DOJ) to initiate civil proceedings to
enjoin violations of the Act, it does not create a private cause of action for the
aggrieved parties.45 Consequently, victims of misappropriation must work
with the U.S. Attorney’s Office to obtain relief. Penalties for misappropriating
36. Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 12, at 179–80.
37. See id. at 179 (explaining that one of the dual purposes of the EEA was to address “the
apparent threat of industrial espionage sponsored by foreign states”).
38. Id. at 178–79.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2006).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831, 1832 (2006).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (criminalizing the “[t]heft of trade secrets”).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (criminalizing “[e]conomic espionage”).
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2006) (providing for a civil cause of action and exclusive federal
jurisdiction, but making no mention of a private cause of action).
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trade secretes include imprisonment and fines assessed against the offending
individuals and organizations.46 Congress recently amended the EEA to
increase its monetary penalties for misappropriation.47
b. The International Trade Commission and Section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930
Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the International Trade
Commission (ITC) has the authority to consider unfair trade practices,
including trade secret misappropriation involving imported products.48 In
TianRui Group Co. v. International Trade Commission, the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the ITC’s authority under Section 337 to apply
domestic law to trade secret misappropriation occurring outside of the United
States if the products related to those trade secrets were imported into the
United States.49 Commentators largely agree that the ITC is a more attractive,
expedient, and powerful regulator of foreign trade secret theft, particularly for
larger companies that can shoulder the litigation expenses.50 Indeed, if the ITC
rules in favor of the trade secret owner, it may issue an “exclusionary order”
that prevents the defendant from shipping the implicated goods into the United
States.51 However, the ITC is not likely to play an adjudicatory role in cases
affecting national security, which involve information that will benefit a
46. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831, 1832. For example, in 2010 scientist Kexue Huang was charged
with stealing trade secrets from his former employer, Dow Agrosciences. Press Release, Chinese
National Sentenced to 87 Months in Prison for Economic Espionage and Theft of Trade Secrets
(Dec. 21, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-crm-1696.html.
He was accused of using those secrets to conduct research that would benefit Chinese
universities. Id. Huang ultimately pleaded guilty and was sentenced to eighty-seven months in
prison. Id.
47. See supra note 14 (describing the penalty increases imposed by the Foreign and
Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012).
48. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703–04 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1337 (2006)) (creating the ITC and authorizing it to investigate and adjudicate cases
involving imports that allegedly infringe intellectual property rights and injure domestic
industry).
49. 661 F.3d 1322, 1332–34 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
50. See Ernest P. Shriver, Separate But Equal: Intellectual Property Importation and the
Recent Amendments to Section 337, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 441, 463–64 (1996).
51. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (“If the Commission determines, as a result of an investigation
under this section, that there is a violation of this section, it shall direct that the articles concerned,
imported by any person violating the provision of this section, be excluded from entry into the
United States, unless, after considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and
welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or directly
competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers, it finds that such articles
should not be excluded from entry.”); see also Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent
Holdup, The ITC, and the Public Interest 105, 122 (Stanford Law School, Working Paper No.
2022168, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2022168
(arguing that the ITC should apply economic and public policy analyses to its exclusion order
decisions).
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foreign state rather than information that can be used to develop or influence
export markets.52 Misappropriation of information relating to national security
is outside of the exclusive jurisdiction of the ITC.53
c. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) is a federal statute that
criminalizes a broad range of actions related to the unauthorized access of a
protected computer, or a computer used in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce.54 The CFFA criminalizes, inter alia, the unauthorized use of a
protected computer to obtain information or to commit fraud.55 The statute
imposes both criminal and civil penalties, including compensatory damages
and equitable relief for the wronged parties.56 The CFAA has a broad scope,
as it prohibits the unauthorized access of a computer, regardless of whether the
computer stores trade secret information.57
Additionally, the CFAA specifically criminalizes the use of a protected
computer to obtain national security information.58 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)
52. See ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY, supra note 1, Appx. B (describing several cases of
trade secret theft and economic espionage involving technical military data stolen to improve
Chinese defense systems); ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 4–5 (noting that foreign actors,
especially from China and Russia, focus their economic espionage and trade secret
misappropriation efforts on information related to national security and military intelligence).
53. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (delineating the authority of the ITC to investigate import
violations that affect the industry and commerce of the United States).
54. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190–91 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)) (criminalizing unauthorized access of a computer containing
sensitive information). Specific reference to “protected computers” was added to § 1030 in 1996.
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104-294, § 201, 110 Stat. 3488, 3491–92 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1030). A “protected computer” is a computer
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Government,
or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a financial
institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting the offense
affects that use by or for the financial institution or the Government; or
(B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication,
including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that
affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (explaining that an individual violates § 1030(a)(4) if he
“knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or
exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains
anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of
the computer and the value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period”).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (defining damages as “any reasonable costs to any victim,
including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the
data, program, system or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost,
cost incurred, or consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service”).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (listing the information and sources of information protected by the
statute and failing to limit that protection to trade secrets).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1). This section provides that any individual who
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prohibits the use of a protected computer without authorization or in excess of
authorization and the subsequent willful supply of the information obtained to
an unauthorized recipient.59 The statute also prohibits the willful retention of
that information.60 However, despite the CFAA’s national security provision,
the statute is rarely used to prosecute national security cases because,
according to the DOJ, other anti-espionage statutes offer a better precedential
foundation and broader enforcement coverage.61
2. State Law
Each state has enacted laws, both statutorily and judicially, that protect trade
secrets.62 Trade secret protection largely depends on the state’s substantive
definition of a trade secret and the actions that constitute a violation of the
property rights to a trade secret, or the “misappropriation” of the trade secret.63
Forty-six states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) to
define, regulate, and protect trade secrets.64 Under the UTSA, a trade secret is
information that
having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized
access, and by means of such conduct having obtained information that has been
determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive order or statute
to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or
foreign relations, or any restricted data, as defined in paragraph y. of section 11 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with reason to believe that such information so obtained
could be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign
nation willfully communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated,
delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive
it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the
United States entitled to receive it . . . shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of
this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1).
60. Id.
61. H. MARSHALL JARRETT & MICHAEL W. BAILIE, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 15
(2d ed.), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual.pdf (last visited August 23,
2013) (explaining that Assistant United States Attorneys rarely charge § 1030(a)(1) violations
because of “the close similarities between sections 1030(a)(1) and 793(e),” and that, “[i]n
situations where both statutes are applicable, prosecutors may tend towards using section 793(e),
for which guidance and precedent are more prevalent”).
62. See David W. Slaby et al., Trade Secret Protection: An Analysis of the Concept “Efforts
Reasonable Under the Circumstances to Maintain Secrecy”, 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 321, 322–23 (1989) (noting that modern trade secret protection is based on the
codification of common law decisions).
63. See Michael J. Hutter, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Lawyer’s Practical Approach
to the Case Law 1 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 1, 9 (1978) (explaining that classification as a trade
secret under the controlling law and “acquisition of the secret by a third party by improper
conduct or unfair means” are prerequisites for liability for trade secret misappropriation).
64. MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 3.29 (2013) (noting that every state except
Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, and Texas has adopted the UTSA).

888

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 62:877

derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use, and [] is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.65
The “information” in question can be “a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process.”66 A trade secret under the
UTSA largely parallels the definition of a trade secret in the EEA.67
Although there is little state law that protects against outbound theft, all
states impose civil penalties for inbound trade secret theft.68 For example,
trade secrets can be misappropriated in a UTSA jurisdiction in two ways.
First, misappropriation may constitute “acquisition of a trade secret of another
by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was
acquired by improper means.”69 Second, a trade secret is misappropriated if it
is disclosed
without express or implied consent by a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that
his knowledge of the trade secret was
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper
means to acquire it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its
secrecy or limit its use; or
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person
seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or had
reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had
been acquired by accident or mistake.70
Acquiring a trade secret by “improper means” includes “theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach to maintain secrecy, or

65. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1986).
66. Id.
67. Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 12 at 188–89 (comparing the UTSA and the EEA);
see also supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text (detailing the definition of a trade secret under
the EEA).
68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995) (defining
“appropriation” of trade secrets as the receipt of the information by an unauthorized individual or
in an unlawful manner); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (defining “misappropriation” in the
same manner). Each state has developed a trade secret enforcement scheme based on the UTSA
or the Restatement. Craig L. Ulrich, The Economic Espionage Act: Reverse Engineering and the
Intellectual Property Public Policy, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 147, 163–64 (2001).
69. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(i).
70. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii).
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espionage through electronic or other means.”71
The definition of
misappropriation under the UTSA is narrower than its counterpart in the
EEA.72
Although they have not adopted the UTSA, Massachusetts,73 New York,74
North Carolina,75 and Texas76 each regulate trade secret misappropriation in a
similar way. Many states have also enacted statutes that criminalize trade
secret theft; however, there are significant obstacles to enforcing these statutes,
including limited state budgets and jurisdiction that is restricted by the state’s
borders.77

71. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1).
72. Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 12 at 188–89 (comparing the UTSA and the EEA);
see also supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text (noting that the EEA prohibits any unlawful
access to information that meets the statutory definition of “trade secret”).
73. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 30(4) (West 2008) (defining “trade secret” as
“anything tangible or intangible or electronically kept or stored, which constitutes, represents,
evidences or records a secret scientific, technical, merchandising, production or management
information, design, process, procedure, formula, invention or improvement”).
74. New York trade secret protection is entirely common law based, and adopts the
definition of a trade secret provided by Section 757 of the Restatement of Torts. Ashland Mgmt.
Inc. v. Janien, 82 N.Y.2d 395, 407 (1993) (relying on the Restatement and state precedent to
adjudicate a trade secret misappropriation case); Michael J. Hutter, The Case for Adoption of a
Uniform Trade Secrets Act in New York 10 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH 1, 6 (1999) (stating that New
York has not adopted a statutory regime to regulate trade secrets and instead relies on “common
law principles derived from the First Restatement of Torts”). The Restatement defines a trade
secret as
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of
manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device,
or a list of customers.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3) (2011) (defining a “trade secret” as “business or technical
information, including but not limited to a formula, pattern, program, device, compilation of
information, method, technique, or process that (a) Derives independent actual or potential
commercial value from not being generally known or readily ascertainable through independent
development or reverse engineering by persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use; and (b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy”).
76. Like New York, Texas regulates trade secrets with common law decisions based on the
Restatement of Torts. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b) (“To determine whether a trade secret exists, this Court applies
the Restatement of Torts’ six-factor test.”).
77. Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 12 at 186 (stating that twenty-four states have
criminal trade secret theft statutes, but that “the applicability of these state criminal laws is
limited by jurisdiction and lack of state resources, particularly in cases with international
ramifications”).
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3. Private Protection of Trade Secrets
In addition to the common law and state and federal statutory regimes
designed to deter and rectify trade secret theft, owners of sensitive information
often use private legal and non-legal mechanisms to preemptively secure
information.
For example, companies often employ non-disclosure
agreements, confidentiality agreements, and covenants-not-to-compete to add
layers of protection to their confidential data.78 Additionally, companies may
use property systems such as patents or copyrights, in conjunction with trade
secrets, to increase information security.79 Finally, companies may use
non-legal mechanisms used to protect trade secrets, such as well-designed
human resource and compliance systems,80 protected networks, and encryption
devices.81
B. National Security Implications
According to ONCIX, trade secret theft by foreign agents has clear and
significant implications for national competitiveness because many of the
country’s most profitable and rapidly-growing industries are targeted for trade
secret theft.82 For example, ONCIX states that clean technologies—energy
-generating technologies that reduce carbon dioxide emissions—are highly
valued targets for acquisition.83 Clean technologies have been linked to long
-term energy security,84 and investments in these technologies have grown
quickly as a result.85 Similarly, pharmaceuticals, nanotechnology, and
agricultural technologies—all of which are industries characterized by high

78. Bishara & Orozco, supra note 31, at 995–96; Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 12, at
218.
79. Bishara & Orozco, supra note 31, at 996.
80. See, e.g., Russell W. Coff, Human Assets and Management Dilemmas: Coping with
Hazards on the Road to Resource-Based Theory, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 374, 380–87 (1997),
available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/259327 (discussing the use of incentives, symbolic gestures, control
rights, and shared governance as methods to retain employees).
81. Ari B. Good, Trade Secrets and the New Realities of the Internet Age, 2 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV., 51, 92–93 (1998).
82. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 8-9 (explaining that foreign collection of U.S. civilian
technologies follows market patterns of investment and trade). ONCIX predicts that clean
technologies, advanced materials and manufacturing techniques, healthcare, pharmaceuticals, and
agricultural technologies will experience a surge in investment and therefore will be targeted
aggressively for acquisition. Id.
83. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
84. See David Orozco, Administrative Patent Levers in the Software, Biotechnology and
Clean Technology Industries, in THE CHANGING FACE OF US PATENT LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON
BUSINESS STRATEGY 42, 54–56 (Daniel C. Cahoy & Lynda J. Oswald eds. 2013); see also Daniel
R. Cahoy, Inverse Enclosure: Abdicating the Green Technology Landscape, 49 AM. BUS. L. J.
805, 829–31, 834 (2012).
85. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
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research and development costs—are also targeted frequently for theft.86 Loss
of trade secrets in these quickly-evolving areas of business has a direct impact
on national competitiveness. As one government enforcement official
explained, “[w]e’ve already lost our manufacturing base. . . . Now we’re
losing our R. & D. base. If we lose that, what do we fall back on?”87
Trade secrets also significantly affect national security if they relate to
classified information or information pertaining to military technologies.
ONCIX stated that the “illicit transfer of technology with military applications
to a hostile state [or organization] could endanger the lives of US and allied
military personnel.”88 Some military technologies are especially susceptible to
trade secret theft;for example, according to ONCIX and the DOD,
Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) are routinely targeted for theft.89
Many technologies related to national security are categorized as dual-use
technologies, or technologies that can be used for both military and non
-military purposes.90
Consequently, many dual-use technologies are
regulated under export control laws rather than trade secret laws. For example,
the Export Administration Act of 1979 authorizes the President to control U.S.
exports for the purpose of national security.91 The Department of Commerce’s
Bureau of Industry Security (BIS) is responsible for administering and
enforcing the Export Administration Act.92
86. Id. at 8–9.
87. Nicole Perlroth, Traveling Light in a Time of Digital Thievery, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2012, at A3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 3; see also United States v. Dongfan Chung, 659 F.3d
815, 828 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding the conviction of the defendant for violating the EEA by
unlawfully transferring trade secrets pertaining to military aircraft technology).
89. DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE, TARGETING U.S. TECHNOLOGIES 16 (2011), available at
http://www.dss.mil/counterintel/2011-unclassified-trends.pdf (describing AUVs as “a class of
underwater vessels capable of submerged, self-propelled locomotion using various enabling
technologies to navigate and perform diverse tasks”).
90. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCE DEPARTMENT EXPORT
CONTROLS 1 (2010) [hereinafter DEP’T OF COMMERCE], available at http://www.bis.doc.
gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_view/142-eccn-pdf.
91. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, §§ 3(2)(B), 5(a)(1), 93 Stat. 503,
504, 506 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2402, 2404) (authorizing the President to “prohibit or
curtail the export of any goods or technology subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or
exported by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” to the extent necessary
“to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared
international obligations”).
92. See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 90. The BIS enforces the Export Administration
Act by issuing Export Administration Regulations (EARs). Id. An important aspect of these
regulations is the Commerce Control List (CCL), which includes all of the technologies that fall
under the EARs. Id. at 3. These technologies include broad categories such as: nuclear
technologies, materials, chemicals, microorganisms, materials processing technologies,
electronics, computers, telecommunications, information security, sensors and lasers, navigation
and avionics, marine and propulsion systems. Id.; see also 15 C.F.R. § 777 Supp. 1 (2012)
(containing the full Commerce Control List).
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The Department of Commerce defines an export as “any item that is sent
from the United States to a foreign destination.”93 Under the Department’s
regulations, the method of exportation is immaterial; the item may be classified
as an export if it is sent via regular mail, hand carry, facsimile, the Internet, by
telephone, or delivered in person.94 Because trade secret theft is increasingly
committed by foreign actors targeting a broad array of technologies that are
regulated by export controls, many thefts have, as a practical matter, the same
effect as the unauthorized exportation of goods.95
The BIS has the authority to regulate military technologies, dual-use
technologies, and even some purely commercial technologies with export
controls.96 Regulated technologies are categorized with an Export Control
Classification Number (ECCN), which identifies items based on the nature of
the product.97 ECCNs allow exporters to determine the “reasons for control,”
which transactions require an export license (based on the country of
destination), and which license exceptions, if any, apply.98
II. THE CHALLENGES OF ENFORCING TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION
LAWS
A. Under-Enforcement
Trade secrets can be difficult to manage and protect. First, the protection of
trade secrets hinges on fiduciary relationships, which trigger mutual and
corresponding duties.99 Unlike patents, trademarks, designs, and copyrights,
the safeguarding of trade secrets largely depends on individuals’ ability to
uphold the legal duties that arise from fiduciary relationships.100
93. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 90, at 2.
94. Id.
95. Compare ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 8–9 (noting that economic, scientific, and
military data are subject to trade secret theft and predicting that dual-use technologies such as
clean technologies, advanced manufacturing techniques, healthcare and pharmaceutical
technologies, agricultural technology, and energy and national resource information will be
increasingly vulnerable to misappropriation), with DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 90, at 1–2
(noting that dual-use technologies and chemicals, materials processing, computers, and
telecommunications and information security are all subject to export controls), and 15
C.F.R. § 777 Supp. 1 (listing other scientific technologies in the Commerce Control List regulated
by export laws).
96. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 90, at 1.
97. Id. at 3.
98. Id. at 5–6 (providing instructions for determining whether a license is necessary for a
particular good or technology and whether a licensing exception applies).
99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01(e) (2005). Contracts such as non
-disclosure agreements, confidentiality agreements, and covenants not to compete may
supplement the default duties arising under agency. See id. (“In addition to an agent’s fiduciary
duties, the agent has a duty to fulfill specific contractual undertakings” imposed by the principal).
100. The need for fiduciary controls is because trade secrets do not possess traditional in rem
property characteristics. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939) (rejecting the
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Trade secrets, like other intangible assets, are non-excludable;101 absent
vigorous monitoring and expensive judicial enforcement, trade secrets are
freely accessible.102 To successfully plead trade secret misappropriation, the
plaintiff must overcome a defense of independent derivation, under which the
defendant claims that he discovered the trade secret through reverse
engineering, or through other permissible means.103 The burden is also on the
plaintiff to prove that he expended reasonable efforts to preserve secrecy.104
This standard can be challenging to satisfy in cases in which the plaintiff
idea that the prohibition of trade secret misappropriation is based in the owner’s property right in
the information); MILGRIM, supra note 23, at § 2.01 (noting that the “property” right in a trade
secret is the right to use and disclose the information).
101. See MILGRIM, supra note 23, at § 2.01 (“[N]either the owner of a trade secret or a
copyright can use its rights to prevent genuine independent development by others.”). See
generally CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 1-19 (1999) (discussing the “information economy”). Although other
categories of intangible property—such as patents, trademarks, and copyright—face challenges
involving non-excludability and costly enforcement, protection of these other forms of
intellectual property is not as under-enforced as protection of trade secrets because of measures to
reduce enforcement costs. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee
Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 346, 351–55 (2012) (describing the
rise of contingent-fee agreements in patent litigation). Rather, protection of this information is
often vigorously enforced. For example, policymakers in the field of trademark law have held
hearings on the aggressive enforcement and policing of trademarks by large companies against
smaller companies and individuals, leading to what is termed “trademark bullying.” See
Trademark Technical and Conforming Amendment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-146, § 4(a)(1),
124 Stat. 66, 70 (requiring the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to study and report to Congress
“the extent to which small businesses may be harmed by litigation tactics by corporations
attempting to enforce trademark rights beyond a reasonable interpretation of the scope of the
rights granted to the trademark owner”). The under-enforcement of trade secret law, therefore, is
an anomaly.
102. Cf. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 101, at 4–5 (explaining that, because of the ease
with which intellectual property can be copied, owners of intellectual property keep the
information closely guarded and protect their rights with increased protection). In 2011, the
American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) conducted surveys to determine the
costs of intellectual property litigation. AM. INTELL. PROP. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY 2011 (2011). The survey found that, in cases in which the amount in controversy was
less than $25 million, the cost of trade secret litigation through trial was $1.3 million. Id. If the
amount in controversy exceeded $25 million, the cost of litigation increased to $3.2 million. Id.
103. See, e.g., Int’l Election Sys. Corp. v. Shoup, 452 F. Supp. 684, 709–10 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(dismissing the plaintiff’s trade secret theft claim because the defendant established that it
developed its own market to sell its product, rather than misappropriating the plaintiff’s customer
list data). Reverse engineering is “the process of studying an item in hopes of obtaining a
detailed understanding of the way it works,” and is “used to create duplicate or superior products
without the benefit of having the plans for the original item.” Uhrich supra note 68 at 155–56.
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2006) (requiring the owner of information to “take
[] reasonable measures to keep such information secret” for the information to be classified as a
trade secret); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1986) (requiring that the information be “the
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy” for the
information to be classified as a trade secret); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b
(1939) (“The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret.”).
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created the protected information with the help of third parties, especially if the
value of the information has appreciated over time.105
Similarly, significant hurdles impede the enforcement of criminal trade
secret laws. Indeed, many believe that the DOJ imposes substantial
prerequisites for enforcement under the EEA.106 According to some accounts,
U.S. attorneys’ offices have imposed a six- or seven-figure loss requirement as
a precondition for prosecution.107 The DOJ is also hesitant to criminally
prosecute cases unless a civil remedy is unavailable.108 Additionally, there are
several other factors that discourage parties from pursuing an EEA claim, such
as the higher burden of proof necessary to criminally convict under the EEA,
the possibility of a lengthy grand jury investigation, the federal government’s
exclusive management of important litigation issues, the forfeiture of the
attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity afforded by civil trials,
and the lack of monetary damages.109 These restrictions may prevent firms
from reporting trade secret theft, compounding the public safety concerns
surrounding the theft of information affecting national security.
Despite the difficulty in addressing trade secret theft, civil litigation of
domestic trade theft is on the rise, demonstrating the importance of trade secret
information.110 However, this increase reflects only domestic civil suits, not
claims brought under the EEA.111 Indeed, although ONCIX reports that trade
105. Bishara & Orozco, supra note 31, at 1011. A recent high-profile example of a
company’s failure to keep data secret involved hackers stealing LinkedIn account users’
passwords. Nicole Perlroth, Lax Security at LinkedIn is Laid Bare, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2012, at
B1. The media widely reported that the breach was the result LinkedIn’s out-of-date and
inadequate security systems. See, e.g., id.
106. Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 12, at 210–11 (noting that an Assistant U.S.
Attorney’s decision to prosecute a trade secret misappropriation case is subject to DOJ approval,
from either the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General
from the Criminal Division). U.S. Attorneys’ offices consider a number of factors in determining
whether a trade secret case will be prosecuted, including “(a) whether the information was clearly
a trade secret; (b) whether the information was technical or scientific in natures; (c) evidence of
criminal conduct and intent; (d) evidence of the information’s monetary value; (e) the availability
of other remedies; and (f) whether the misappropriation was promptly reported.” Id. at 211.
107. Victoria Slind-Flor, Industry Spying Still Flourishes, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 29, 2000, at B8;
see also Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 12, at 214 (indicating that “the monetary loss to the
victim must be great enough to merit criminal investigation and prosecution,” greater than
$100,000 in some districts).
108. Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 12, at 215.
109. Joseph N. Hosteny, The Economic Espionage Act: A Very Mixed Blessing, INTELL.
PROP. TODAY, Feb. 1998, 7–8, http://www.hosteny.com/articles/espionage.html.
110. David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State
Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 66–68 (2011) [hereinafter State Court Analysis] (finding that trade
secret litigation in federal courts is increasing at an exponential rate, but at the same time is
increasing at only a modest rate in state courts).
111. David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal
Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 303–04 (2009) [hereinafter Federal Court Analysis]. The
Almeling study of trade secret litigation in federal courts concluded that concerns about foreign
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secret theft by foreign actors is growing at a considerable pace,112 this type of
trade secret theft is rarely prosecuted.113 The restrictions imposed by the DOJ
and the EEA itself likely discourage injured parties from reporting violations
and from using the statute as an enforcement mechanism. The failure to report
trade secret theft and to enforce trade secret laws, in turn, motivates trade
secret thieves to continue engaging in this profitable activity.114
B. Market Failures
Given their status as valuable property rights, the marketplace should, in
theory, provide adequate incentives to safeguard and enforce trade secrets.
Evidence indicates that, although prosecution of domestic trade secret thefts
has increased, cases involving foreign actors remain unenforced.115 This
disparity, according to a market efficiency theory, is caused by (1) cross-border
enforcement costs; (2) negative reputational impact; and (3) inadequate
information technology (IT) and compliance capabilities.
1. Cross-Border Enforcement Costs
Pursuing civil remedies in foreign trade secret theft cases under the EEA is
often prohibitively expensive. First, the complexities that arise during the
discovery process can significantly raise litigation costs.116 To further
complicate matters, each country has its own trade secret law and hiring local
counsel with adequate knowledge of a foreign jurisdiction’s legal system and

trade secret misappropriation “may be overblown” because most trade secret theft is committed
by domestic actors. Id. This statement, however, does not take into account the central problem
of foreign trade secret theft, which is that the victim is often reluctant to pursue claims of foreign
theft due to the inordinate costs of litigation. See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text
(discussing the barriers to trade secret law litigation and enforcement). Moreover, there is a
fundamental difference between domestic theft and foreign state-sponsored theft, adding to the
disparity between the number of domestic theft cases and foreign theft cases. While the majority
of plaintiffs in domestic theft cases know the defendants, State Court Analysis, supra note 110, at
69 (noting that domestic thieves are often former employees or business partners), data thieves in
cases involving foreign actors are usually anonymous, Federal Court Analysis, supra, at 303.
112. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 1.
113. See id. at 5 (reporting that only seven cases were adjudicated under the EEA in 2010).
114. See id. at 4 (estimating that a company’s trade secret can be worth $20 million and that
trade secret theft and economic espionage are responsible for the loss of up to $400 billion each
year).
115. See State Court Analysis, supra note 110, at 66–68 (tracking the increase in trade secret
theft litigation in state and federal courts); ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 5 (reporting that
there were only seven prosecutions under the EEA in 2010); Federal Court Analysis, supra note
111, at 303–04 (noting that third parties, such as foreign actors, “comprise a small percentage of
alleged misappropriators”).
116. See J. Benjamin Bai & Gupoing Da, Strategies for Trade Secret Protection in China, 9
NW. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 351, 362 (2011) (explaining that there is no U.S.-style discovery
process in China and discussing other technical hurdles that make discovery in foreign trade
secret litigation more cumbersome than in domestic litigation).
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paying for translation services can raise costs substantially.117 Similarly,
attempting to gather evidence abroad can pose unique challenges that require
patience, creativity, and significant resources.118
Because it is so difficult to litigate, foreign trade secret theft is best reserved
for federal authorities to address under the appropriate criminal statutes and
with the aid of government intelligence information and enforcement
mechanisms. The U.S. government is especially interested in discovering the
sources of the theft of sensitive information because of the national security
concerns.119 The U.S. government, unlike private companies, has the
intelligence capabilities needed to uncover the sources of this theft.120 Private
companies, on the other hand, are either unable to trace the party’s identity or
unwilling to do so.121 It is also increasingly difficult for private companies to
distinguish between cyber crime, trade secret theft, and the collection of
economic or technological information by foreign intelligence services.122
2. Reputational Costs
When a company discovers that a trade secret has been stolen, more often
than not the company will choose not to seek legal remedy. According to
ONCIX, a company may keep a security breach private because it could
“tarnish a company’s reputation and endanger its relationships with its
investors, bankers, suppliers, customers and other stakeholders.”123 An
empirical study using an event study methodology confirmed that the value of
a publicly traded company can decrease by millions of dollars when the
company announces that it has decided to work with federal officials to
prosecute a case under the EEA.124 Many companies, absent regulations
requiring affirmative disclosure, elect to remain silent and allow the theft to go
unpunished.125 Moreover, the unavailability of civil damages under the EEA
117. See R. Doak Bishop, International Litigation in Texas: Obtaining Evidence in Foreign
Countries, 19 HOUS. L. REV. 361, 361 (1982).
118. Id. See generally HAROUT J. SAMRA, THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF
USING U.S. DISCOVERY IN AID OF FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEEDINGS (2013),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/sac
2013/sac_2013/13_using_discovery_in_aird.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing various techniques to
conduct U.S.-style discovery abroad).
119. ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 1 (expressing a commitment to
prosecuting foreign trade secret theft, which “threatens American businesses, undermines national
security, and places the security of the U.S. economy in jeopardy”).
120. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
121. Id. at 1–2 (noting that private companies are more concerned with addressing the
damage caused by trade secret theft than identifying the perpetrator).
122. Id. at 1.
123. Id. at 3.
124. See Chris Carr & Larry Gorman, The Revictimization of Companies by the Stock Market
Who Report Trade Secret Theft Under the Economic Espionage Act, 57 BUS. LAW. 25, 48–49
(2001) (finding that the stock market negatively reacts to the disclosure of trade secret theft).
125. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 3.
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to offset these reputational costs provides little incentive for private companies
to report theft.126
3. Inadequate IT and Compliance Capabilities
Some business managers view investment in IT programs as an unnecessary
cost.127 Indeed, companies may reach a level of sophistication at which
investment in IT safeguards has a negative impact on the company’s ability to
compete with market prices.128 However, IT capabilities have a demonstrably
positive effect on business strategy and have a significant impact on a
company’s bottom line.129 The perception of investment in IT as a cost driver
may, therefore, lead to suboptimal investments in IT capabilities meant to
safeguard a company’s most valuable technologies and knowledge-based
assets.130
Accordingly, it is crucial for businesses to integrate IT security programs
into their top leadership team, as well as into legal and compliance
departments.131 Multifunctional coordination of IT resources is important for
security because it can contribute to successful legal outcomes in the event of a
breach,132 as well as to help companies proactively keep track of information
moving within and in and out of the organization.133 To compound the
problem, companies increasingly rely on a “high velocity” and contingent
workforce, which may facilitate the movement of sensitive information.134
The highly mobile state of information in modern business justifies investment

126. Civil relief under the EEA constitutes injunctive relief. 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2006). The
statute provides no private cause of action for damages. Id.
127. Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 9 (2008).
128. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Nuclear Lessons for Cybersecurity?, STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 18, 28
(2011) (noting that “[f]irms have an incentive to provide for their own security up to a point, but
the competitive pricing of their products limits” those expenditures).
129. Bird, supra note 127, at 10.
130. See Nye, supra note 128, at 28–29 (concluding that there is “an underinvestment in
security from the national perspective”).
131. See Russell Beck & Matt Karlyn, IT Security: A Practical Approach to Protecting Trade
Secrets, CIO (Nov. 11 2009), http://www.cio.com/article/507359/IT_Security_A_Practical
_Approach_to_Protecting_Trade_Secrets?page=3&taxonomyId=3187
(advocating
for
cooperation between business owners and directors, legal counsel, and IT departments to protect
their companies from trade secret theft).
132. See David Orozco, Legal Knowledge as an Intellectual Property Management Resource,
47 AM. BUS. L.J. 687, 687–94 (2010) (discussing the importance of integrating legal and
managerial knowledge as a source of competitive advantage); David Orozco, Rational Design
Rights Ignorance, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 573, 603–04 (2009) (discussing how companies can obtain
unique and rare intellectual property outcomes by reducing coordination costs within the firm).
133. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at i, 3 (noting that businesses are often uninformed of
how information moves within and outside of the boundaries of the organization and that “[m]any
companies are unaware when their sensitive data is pilfered”).
134. Bishara & Orozco, supra note 31, at 1004.
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in state-of-the-art IT security programs and the addition of IT representatives
to various levels and departments within an organization.
C. Agency-Related Legal Impediments
In addition to market failures and high transaction costs, deficiencies in the
general legal framework result in poor management and enforcement of trade
secret laws and insufficient reporting of trade secret theft. The two most
problematic impediments to the enforcement of trade secret laws are the
inadequate protection of whistleblowers and lax corporate governance
requirements.
1. Inadequate Protection of Whistleblowers
None of the existing trade secret statutory regimes require a party to report a
suspected trade secret theft.135 Additionally, none of the statutes provide
whistleblower protection for an individual who discloses trade secret theft and
consequently faces retaliation from his employer.136
Although the majority of states have enacted laws to shield public
employees from retaliation by their employers, few states extend that
Moreover, state
protection to employees of private companies.137
whistleblower laws vary significantly in the level of protection offered to
employees.138 Employers are also able to circumvent whistleblower protection
laws by hiring at-will employees, who can be fired at any time and for any
reason—including purely retaliatory discharge—without exposing the
employer to liability.139
Because there is no affirmative legal duty to disclose trade secret theft,
existing state laws largely fail to protect employees who report trade secret
theft. Many state whistleblower laws, however, require the disclosure to be of
violations of law committed by the employer in order for the employee to
qualify for protection from retaliation.140 Consequently, without a duty to

135. See supra Part I.A. and accompanying text (detailing the federal and state regulation of
trade secrets).
136. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006) (no protection for whistleblowers); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39
(2006 & Supp. 2012) (same); 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006) (same); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT
(1986) (same).
137. Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower
Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 111 (2000); Kevin Rubenstein, Note, Internal Whistleblowing
and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806: Balancing the Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV., 637, 643 (2007) (“Most states offer general whistleblower protection to public
employees, while a minority of states provide the same protection to all workers.”).
138. Rubenstein, supra note 137.
139. Id. at 640 (observing that a “[s]trict application of [the at-will] doctrine would allow an
employer to terminate a whistleblower without facing any liability even if the discharge was
purely for retaliatory purposes”).
140. For example, New York’s whistleblower protection statute states that:
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report trade secret theft and corresponding protection for the disclosing
employee, an employer is free to take action against employees revealing trade
secret theft without violating any law.
Conversely, federal law offers a patchwork of whistleblower protection, but
only in cases in which the specific statute grants immunity from retaliation.141
The federal law that could offer the most protection to whistleblowers of trade
secret misappropriation is Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.142 Section
806 provides a civil remedy to any employee who suffers retaliation for
reporting a securities fraud or violation, or the violation of any provision of
federal law prohibiting fraud against shareholders.143 Section 806 applies to
companies “with a class of securities registered under Section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . or that [are] required to file reports under

An employer shall not take any retaliatory personnel action against an employee
because such employee . . . discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a
public body an activity, policy, or practice of the employer that is in violation of law,
rule or regulation which violation creates and presents a substantial and specific danger
to the public health or safety, or which constitutes health care fraud.
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2013) (emphasis added).
141. Some federal statutes offer protection for whistleblowers who charge or testify against
their employers for violating the particular statute. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006)
(prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation of the Clayton Act); 15 U.S.C.
§ 2622(a) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation of the Toxic
Substances Control Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006 & Supp. 2012) (prohibiting the discharge of
an employee who reports violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2006)
(prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation of the National Labor Relations
Act); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation
of the Equal Pay Act); 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee
who reports violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006) (prohibiting
the discharge of an employee who reports violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act); 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a), 1140 (2006 & Supp. 2012)
(prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act); 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who
reports violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2006 & Supp.
2011) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation of the False Claims Act);
42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(1) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation
of the Safe Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an
employee who reports violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
(2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports
violation of the Energy Reorganization Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6971(a) (2006) (prohibiting the
discharge of an employee who reports violation of the Solid Waste Disposal Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7622(a) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation of the Clean Air
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9610(a) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act).
142. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A).
143. § 806, 116 Stat. at 802.
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Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”144 However, Section
806 would likely fail to offer relief to an employee suffering from retaliation
by his employer as a consequence of disclosing trade secret theft because the
failure to report trade secret misappropriation has never been classified as a
fraud on a company’s shareholders.145 Furthermore, because Section 806
applies to only the small subset of public companies registered under Section
12, many of the companies most vulnerable to trade secret theft—those
companies developing technologies that affect national security—fall outside
of the statute’s reach.146
2. Ineffective Corporate Fiduciary Law
A basic tenet of American law is that a corporation’s directors and
executives have a fiduciary duty to the organization. The fiduciary
relationship is created by the law of agency, under which the agent agrees to
act on the principal’s behalf and is subject to the principal’s control.147 This
relationship creates duties and corresponding rights between the parties.148
Existing corporate fiduciary laws are poorly equipped to address cases
involving trade secret theft, particularly those cases involving a foreign state
-sponsored entity. Consequently, if a foreign actor misappropriates trade
secrets as the result of the breach of a corporate fiduciary duty, there is no
adequate safeguard to establish liability.
a. The Business Judgment Rule and Trade Secret Misappropriation
Directors of a corporation are legally required to oversee fundamental
transactions, such as the sale of the business, a merger, changes to the capital
structure, and the appointment and compensation of the chief executive
officer.149 These decisions are fundamental transactions of the corporation and
are therefore evaluated under the business judgment rule.150 The business
144. Id.
145. Cf. Rustad, supra note 9, at 474 (noting that there is no affirmative duty to report trade
secret misappropriation); Rubenstein, supra note 137, at 647 (asserting that Sarbanes-Oxley
protects employees reporting violations of securities laws, which excludes trade secret
misappropriation).
146. See § 806, 116 Stat. at 802 (protecting only employees of companies registered under
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
147. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2005).
148. Id. at § 1.01 cmt. e (discussing the rights and duties of the agency relationship).
149. See, e.g., In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996) (requiring the board of
directors to authorize “significant corporate acts”); see also DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, 141(a) (“The
business and affairs of every corporation organized under this [statute] shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this [statute]
or in its certification of incorporation.”).
150. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73, 893 (Del. 1985) (holding that the
directors of the defendant corporation breached their duty of care to the corporation by failing to
fully investigate before approving a merger), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens,
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judgment rule protects the directors or officers if they act with adequate
information, in good faith, and with the subjective belief that their action was
in the best interests of the corporation.151
The business judgment rule rests on the assumption that managers and
directors have “skills, information[,] and judgment not possessed by reviewing
courts, and [that] there is great social utility in encouraging the allocation of
assets and the evaluation and assumption of economic risk by those with such
skill and information.”152 Generally, courts avoid second-guessing legitimate
business decisions.153 Delaware courts, for example, subscribe to the
contractarian approach to corporate governance, which allows companies to
determine their rights and responsibilities contractually, rather than rely on the
legislature to allocate them statutorily.154
As a consequence of the contractarian approach, Delaware courts apply the
business judgment rule only in cases in which corporate directors act
affirmatively; cases in which directors simply fail to act fall outside of the

965 A.2d 695, 713 & n. 54 (Del. 2009); Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (explaining that the business
judgment rule is applied to cases involving harmful decisions by the board of directors).
151. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000); see also Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967
(“[C]ompliance with a director’s duty of care can never appropriately be judicially determined by
reference to the content of the board decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from
consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process employed.”).
152. In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988) (quoting
Solash v. Telex Corp., C.A. No. 9518, 1988 WL 3587, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988)).
153. See Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. The Business Judgment
Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 587 (1994) (describing the rules in place
to prevent “retrospective evaluations” of “negligent business decisions”). Courts are keenly
aware of the potential to engage in hindsight bias, or “the tendency for people with knowledge of
an outcome to exaggerate the extent to which they believe the outcome could have been
predicted.” Id.
154. Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC Manager After More
than a Decade of Experimentation?, 32J. CORP. L. 565, 569 (2007) (noting that contractarian
states, including Delaware, “expressly defer to the parties’ agreement” in resolving corporate
disputes). The contractarian approach rests on the perception of the corporation as a collection of
contracts or agreements by which the corporation can be governed. See generally Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1426, 1428
(1989) (“The arrangements among the actors constituting the corporation usually depend on
contracts and on positive law, not on corporate law or the status of the corporation as an entity.”).
See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and
the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 822–23 (1999) (describing the corporation as a
“nexus of reciprocal agreements” relied upon to govern the company); Thomas S. Ulen, The
Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 318–28 (1993) (arguing that
corporations use contracts to address both internal and external affairs). Rather than favoring
mandatory and uniform public regulation, contractarians favor private market-ordering
transactions that allow shareholders and directors to opt in or out of regulations. See J. Robert
Brown, Jr. & Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only In: Contractarians, Waiver of Liability Provisions,
and the Race to the Bottom 42 IND. L. REV. 285, 285-86 (2009).
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scope of the business judgment rule.155 Delaware courts instead evaluate
inaction under the duty of loyalty, which requires plaintiffs to specifically
plead that the directors or officers of the corporation intentionally acted
against—or chose not to act in—the corporation’s best interests.156 Corporate
directors or officers are, therefore, free from liability under most state
corporate governance laws if they pay only cursory attention to trade secret
reporting or management practices, even if they are grossly negligent in their
inaction.
b. The Oversight Doctrine and Trade Secret Misappropriation
Corporate governance law related to business processes, such as trade secret
management, may also fall under the “oversight doctrine,” which has been
developed over the years by Delaware courts.157 The oversight doctrine
protects directors and some officers from personal liability unless they breach
the duty of loyalty owed to the corporation.158
The oversight doctrine stands for the proposition that the duty of loyalty may
be breached if a director or officer neglects to impose information and
reporting requirements.159 In In re Caremark, the Delaware Court of Chancery
explained that “a director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith
to assure that a corporate information and reporting system . . . exists and that

155. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813. In practice, although the duty of care liability standard for
affirmative decisions is perceived as lax, the Delaware Legislature tempered the standard by
amending the Delaware General Corporation Law “to allow for an optional charter provision to
exculpate directors for violations of the duty of care.” See Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good
Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 466 (2004). This amendment allows a corporation to elect
whether or not it wishes to immunize corporate directors and officers from any duty of care
liability whatsoever. Id. Many corporations today provide this liability waiver.
156. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 367 & n.9, 370 (Del. 2006) (requiring the plaintiff to
plead specific factual allegations, rather that conclusory, general, or speculative statements). This
specificity standard also requires the plaintiff include specific facts that indicate intent, which can
be a difficult hurdle to overcome. Id.
157. See Nadelle Grossman, The Duty to Think Strategically 28–29 (Jan. 1, 2012) (Marquette
Univ. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 11-19) [hereinafter Duty to Think Strategically], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1919145.
Delaware law has significant
influence over general corporate governance law because most public corporations are
incorporated in Delaware. Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary
Duties in a Climate of Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 397
(2007). Other jurisdictions often look to Delaware law for guidance. Id.
158. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (holding that a director breaches his duty of loyalty under
the oversight doctrine if he completely neglects to enact a risk monitoring system, or he enacts a
system but consciously fail to monitor it). It remains unclear whether officers are held to the
same standard as directors. Although the existing Delaware cases involved actions by both
directors and officers, the cases interpreting the oversight doctrine exclusively mention the duties
imposed on and breached by directors. See Duty to Think Strategically, supra note 157, at 32–33.
159. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 970, 970–71 (Del. Ch. 1996).

2013]

Amending the Economic Espionage Act

903

failure to do so under some circumstances may . . . render a director liable for
losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.”160
The general reaction following Caremark was that directors would face
greater liability for deficient oversight of business performance, such as the
mismanagement of trade secrets.161 However, the oversight doctrine was
narrowed in subsequent cases, and it became clear that oversight issues would
be assessed under the higher duty of loyalty standard. Indeed, in Stone v.
Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court refined Caremark’s mandate by outlining
the evidence required to establish liability in business-oversight cases.162 Stone
requires the plaintiff to show that either “(a) the directors utterly failed to
implement any reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having
implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or
oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks
or problems requiring their attention.”163
However, in practice, the test articulated in Stone offers little chance of
recovery. If the company has some type reporting system in place, it is not
liable unless the plaintiff satisfies the difficult burden of proving that the
director intentionally relinquished his monitoring responsibilities.164
Consequently, the oversight doctrine often protects the director from liability
so long as a control system exists, even if trade secret misappropriation or
other harm results from an outdated or inadequate oversight mechanism that
falls well behind the industry’s best practices.165 As explained in Caremark,
director liability based on the duty of oversight “is possibly the most difficult
theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a
judgment.”166

160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, In re Caremark: Good Intentions,
Unintended Consequences, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691, 691 (2004) (predicting that, following
Caremark, “boards that fail to establish effective corporate compliance procedures may face
substantial liability”).
162. 911 A.2d at 370 (“We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate
for director oversight liability.”).
163. Id.
164. See id. (emphasizing the disjunctive nature of the test articulated in Caremark).
165. See William W. Bratton, Lyondell: A Note of Approbation, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV., 561,
570–72 (2010) (arguing that Delaware’s “lesser rather than [] greater” approach in Caremark and
Stone “slams down the book of best practices” because it requires “knowing and complete
failure” to fulfill responsibilities); see also Perlroth, supra note 105 (arguing that, because there
are no legal consequences for negligent monitoring, some companies have “a devil-may-care
attitude toward data”). Increasing corporate liability for business-related trade secrets may be
appropriate, but considering a change in state corporate fiduciary law is beyond the scope of this
Article.
166. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 2006).
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III. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AMENDING THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT
The gap in the enforcement of trade secret protection laws, especially in
situations of foreign trade secret theft, indicates that the EEA should be
amended to increase protection of trade secret information. This could best be
accomplished by imposing an affirmative duty of disclosure of trade secret
misappropriation that affects national security.167
In American jurisprudence, affirmative legal duties are generally an
exception to the rule favoring negative duties.168 It is well accepted that a
governmental demand to perform is significantly more burdensome than a
command to refrain from harmful action.169 As a result, the imposition of an
affirmative duty requires strong public policy justifications.170 The public
policy justifications for imposing an affirmative duty to disclose trade secret
theft are detailed below.
However, it is important to note that American law also recognizes that
clearly defining the scope of an affirmative duty to perform minimizes the
governmental intrusion.171 Here, the duty is clearly defined as a duty to report
a trade secret theft if the theft applies to any technology that affects national
security.172 This requirement would not impose an obligation to prevent the
theft, or correct the harm arising from the theft. Rather, the duty is simply to
disclose the theft to an enforcement agency, which would then decide whether
to pursue the matter if it involves a state-sponsored attack, a threat to national
security, or if it would be useful to intelligence-gathering agencies.
A. Protection of the Public Interest
An affirmative duty to act must be justified by a significant public
interest.173 In the case of trade secret misappropriation, the significant public
interest is the substantial value of information and the impact of the theft of
that information on public welfare and national security.
Many state governments have recognized the public interest in information
security and have imposed affirmative disclosure duties in analogous cases of
information theft. For example, several states require companies to disclose
167. See infra Part IV (proposing the text of the amendment and discussing its provisions and
the benefits of imposing an affirmative duty to disclose).
168. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Liability for Omissions: A Brief Summary and Critique of
the Law in the United States, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV., 101, 104 (1984) (describing the “general
reluctance in the United States to impose affirmative duties”).
169. Id.
170. Id. (arguing that an affirmative duty must be both justified by strong public policy
benefits and “imposed in a way that minimizes the extent of the intrusion”).
171. Cf. id. (noting that the rule against affirmative duties is based, in part, on the difficulty
of defining the scope of the duty, which makes the duty difficult to enforce).
172. See infra Part V (providing the text of the proposed amendment).
173. Robinson, supra note 168, at 104–05 (explaining that the public interest, including the
health and safety of the public, can justify an affirmative duty).
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breaches of data security.174 California was the first state to enact such a
disclosure requirement with the Security Breach Notification Act.175 Other
states followed suit and enacted similar legislation, and now forty-six states
impose notification requirements.176 This trend suggests that more, if not all,
states will adopt such legislation in the future.
Similarly, several members of Congress recently proposed the Cybersecurity
Act of 2012, which was written to protect critical domestic infrastructure from
cyber warfare attacks.177 Had Congress passed the Act, it would have imposed
an affirmative duty on companies that control critical infrastructure to report
any “significant cyber incidents affecting critical cyber infrastructure.”178
Additionally, some corporate governance laws impose an affirmative duty
on managers in situations in which nondisclosure of information would cause
significant harm to the corporation.179 For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
requires the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of an organization to certify the
correctness of financial statements and that the company has promulgated
Likewise, the Securities and Exchange
adequate internal controls.180
Commission (SEC) requires directors to take affirmative steps to ensure that
the corporation’s communications with the public are truthful.181
174. See Andrew B. Serwin, Poised on the Precipice: A Critical Examination of Privacy
Litigation, 25 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 883, 884 (2009) (detailing the states that
have enacted security breach laws that “mandate public disclosure of data incidents”).
175. Id. The statute requires
[a]ny person or business that conducts business in California, and that owns or licenses
computerized data that includes personal information, shall disclose any breach of the
security of the system following discovery or notification of the breach in the security
of the data to any resident of California whose unencrypted personal information was,
or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person. The
disclosure shall be made in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable
delay, consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement, as provided in
subdivision (c), or any measures necessary to determine the scope of the breach and
restore the reasonable integrity of the data system.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2013).
176. Serwin, supra note 174.
177. Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S.3414, 112th Cong. (2012). The Act was originally
introduced as S.2105, but the Senate voted on the version of the Act introduced as S.3414. 158
CONG. REC. S.5919 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2012). The Act ultimately failed a vote of cloture and was
not passed. Id.; see supra note 13 and accompanying text (detailing the progression of the Act
and its reintroduction in 2013).
178. Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S.3414, 112th Cong. § 102(b)(4) (2012). “Critical cyber
infrastructure” includes infrastructures that affect life-sustaining services and the U.S. economy.
S.3414, § 102(b)(3)(B).
179. See Duty to Think Strategically, supra note 157, at 27 (explaining that the duties of
loyalty and care require affirmative actions by directors of corporations).
180. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 906, 116 Stat. 745, 806 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
181. Conduct of Certain Former Officers and Directors of W.R. Grace & Co., Exchange Act
Release No. 34,39157, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,963, at 89,893 (Sept.
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B. Protection of Critical Technologies with a Unified National Policy
Adding a disclosure requirement to the EEA would also be consistent with
the policy goals of export control laws. Export control laws are aimed at
regulating the export of tangible goods to prevent the use of those goods in a
manner that may harm national interests.182 From a policy perspective,
however, the laws’ emphasis on actual goods fails to ensure the protection of
the underlying technology involved in creating the goods, allowing for
recreation of the goods through reverse engineering.183
Policymakers are increasingly recognizing the eroding distinction between
goods and the underlying technology used to create them, viewing the nation’s
infrastructure as a combination of tangible and intangible components.184
Accordingly, because of the increasing technological competence and
sophistication of foreign states and organizations,185 export control laws should
regulate not only actual goods, but also the technology behind these goods.
This can be accomplished by amending the EEA. Requiring disclosure of the
misappropriation of trade secret information will help to increase protection of
the intellectual property associated with the manufacturing of some exported
goods.
C. Expansion of Protection for Explicit Knowledge
The importance of explicit knowledge to the modern economy provides
additional justification for amending the EEA to address trade secret
misappropriation. The rapid evolution toward a knowledge-based economy
has had a significant impact on business, society, and national
competitiveness.186 One of the key challenges in this environment is to
30, 1997) (asserting that an officer or director of a public company has “substantial obligations”
and that “[i]f an officer or director knows or should know that his or her company’s statements
concerning particular issues are inadequate or incomplete, he or she has an obligation to correct
that failure”).
182. See, e.g., Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 3(2), 93 Stat. 503,
504 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 2402 (2006)) (controlling the export of goods that “would
make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other country or combination of
countries which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States”).
183. Reverse engineering is an accepted form of recreating the item in question without
misappropriating the information underlying its creation. Ulrich, supra note 68, at 156–57
(noting that reverse engineering is “implicitly accepted” by trade secret law).
184. See NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 4 (2007) [hereinafter NCIX STRATEGY],
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/cistrategy2007.pdf (“In collaboration with our
colleagues throughout the government, the counterintelligence community will protect our vital
national assets—critical infrastructure, sensitive technologies, key resources, networks, and
knowledge—from intelligence-related attack.”).
185. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 5–6 (describing the sophisticated techniques foreign
actors use to misappropriate sensitive information).
186. See ADMINISTRATIVE STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 1–2 (describing intangible assets and
intellectual property as “the innovation that drives the American economy and supports jobs in
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incentivize innovation, which is accomplished by protecting knowledge-based
assets that are non-rivalrous and non-excludable.187 Accordingly, the legal
system has evolved to provide some measure of security and efficiency in the
marketplace of ideas.188 Enforcement costs and ease of replication, however,
pose significant challenges to innovators who wish to protect their intellectual
property.189 The problem is compounded when business is conducted overseas
in jurisdictions that do not adequately protect knowledge.190
Trade secrets are especially vulnerable to this type of knowledge theft
because companies routinely memorialize information. In its tacit form,
knowledge is difficult to perceive and replicate.191 The information used to
develop important technologies, therefore, is often made explicit to extract its
full value.192 However, when knowledge is made explicit and recorded, it is
substantially easier to misappropriate the information.193 The codification of
trade secret information creates an exact blueprint for replication and, if the
information is misappropriated, the technology can easily be “reverse
-engineered.”194
Lastly, the process of creating a technology is often a key ingredient to using
the technology. For example, a manufacturing process may be the main source

the United States” and noting that this information affects American businesses and the economy,
national security, and economic competitiveness); SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 101, at 4
(discussing the value of information).
187. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 101, at 4 (arguing that owners of intellectual property
are unable to recover the high production cost of information without the enforcement of their
intellectual property rights).
188. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2006) (prohibiting the infringement of copyrights); 18 U.S.C.
1831–32 (2006) (protecting trade secrets from misappropriation); 35 U.S.C. 271 (2006 & Supp.
2012) (prohibiting the infringement of patents).
189. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 101, at 3–4 (noting that intellectual property rights do
not “confer complete power to control information” because the ability to copy and instantly send
information around the world has made enforcement difficult).
190. See, e.g., Bai & Da, supra note 116, at 362–63 (stating that, even though China has
implemented many laws and regulations to protect trade secrets, significant challenges exist due
to technical and procedural aspects of the Chinese legal system).
191. See IKUJIRO NONAKA & HIROTAKA TAKEUCHI, THE KNOWLEDGE-CREATING
COMPANY: HOW JAPANESE COMPANIES CREATE THE DYNAMICS OF INFORMATION 8 (1995)
(explaining that tacit knowledge, in part, consists of “hard-to-pin-down skills or crafts captured in
the term ‘know-how’”).
192. Id. (“Explicit knowledge can be expressed in words and numbers, and easily
communicated and shared in the form of hard data, scientific formulae, codified procedures, or
universal principles.”).
193. Id. at 8–9. Conversely, tacit knowledge is internalized and cannot be easily transmitted
through formula or code. Id.
194. For example, some codified technologies such as software are copied or reverse
engineered when the source code is misappropriated. See Markoff supra note 4, at A1 (predicting
that the theft of Google’s software system will provide the hackers with the information needed to
replicate—“reverse engineer”—Google’s system).
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of competitive advantage for innovative manufacturing firms.195 If the process
is tacit, it can be very difficult to replicate.196 Companies, however, often seek
to record processes and business methods to increase the store of knowledge
within the company.197 Often, this methodology is classified as a trade
secret.198 Consequently, the misappropriation of a process-based technology
may completely undermine the company’s competitive advantage.199
IV. AMENDING THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT TO REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF
TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION IN CASES INVOLVING NATIONAL
SECURITY
The EEA should be amended to require disclosure of suspected outbound
trade secret theft. The amendment would read as follows:
No person with reasonable knowledge that a violation of this Act has
been or is being committed with respect to technologies that are
subject to export regulations shall fail to report such information to a
federal law enforcement agency.
Whoever violates this section shall be fined not more than $_____ or
imprisoned more than _____ years, or both.
The proposed amendment would both serve the policy goals explained
above and encourage better data security to protect trade secret information
and, as a consequence, national security.
The technologies affected by the amendment are those that qualify as trade
secrets under the EEA.200 The technologies and products that are regulated by
export laws but that are not considered trade secrets by the EEA are excluded
by the amendment. Technologies that both qualify as trade secrets under the
EEA and are subject to export control, however, are covered by the
amendment.
Although some whistleblower laws require actual knowledge of a
violation,201 the proposed amendment imposes a lesser mens rea standard by
195. See TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
David Orozco, Administrative Patent Levers, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2012) (noting that
business methodology and “fundamental business techniques” are important economic resources).
196. See NONAKA & TAKEUCHI, supra note 191, at 8–9 (explaining that tact knowledge is
internal and not easily disseminated).
197. See Orozco, supra note 195, at 8–14 (explaining that some business methods can be
converted into explicit knowledge, which takes the form of a utility patent).
198. See, e.g., TianRui Grp. Co., 661 F.3d at 1325 (classifying a manufacturing process as a
trade secret).
199. See id. (emphasizing the need for a remedy for the misappropriation of a business
process).
200. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2006).
201. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2013) (prohibiting
retaliatory action against an employee where the employee discloses or threatens to disclose a
practice that “is in violation of law” (emphasis added)).
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requiring reasonable knowledge of a violation. Several data security breach
and whistleblower statutes impose a similar reasonable knowledge standard.202
A reasonable knowledge requirement is appropriate because although trade
secret misappropriation can be difficult to ascertain due to the thieves’ efforts
to conceal the activity,203 there are still indicators that signal trade secret theft.
For example, a company’s IT department may have knowledge of a data
breach that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that trade secrets were
accessed or obtained.
The proposed amendment also imposes a substantial penalty on any
individual who fails to report a suspected trade secret theft. As with many
other white collar offenses, prosecutors may evaluate the defendant’s level of
culpability and conclude that imposing a fine is more appropriate than criminal
penalties.204 Likewise, judges may rely on the organizational sentencing
guidelines to impose the most effective fine.
Prosecutors may also reach a settlement agreement that defers or avoids
criminal prosecution if the defendant agrees to institute a compliance
program.205 Such compliance programs typically encompass: (1) a written
policy related to the legal issue distributed throughout the company;
(2) employee training; (3) improved recordkeeping; (4) compliance
certification at all organizational levels; (5) internal audits and, sometimes,
external monitoring; (6) improved screening of third party agents; and (7) a
mechanism for rapid and thorough investigation if the defendant suspects a
violation.206
The proposed amendment imposes an affirmative duty to report suspected
theft to federal enforcement authorities rather than to a superior within the
organization. This avoids the harm that might occur if the organization fails to
take action. Requiring a party to report the theft directly to a public

202. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2012) (prohibiting retaliation of an
employee who reports violation of securities laws); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2009
& Supp. 2013) (requiring disclosure if an individual reasonably believes that a data breach has
occurred); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2 (2008) (prohibiting retaliation against an employee
who “has reasonable cause to believe” that the employer has violated the law); see also Passaic
Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 474–75 (3d Cir. 1993) (considering
whether an employee’s allegations against his employer were reasonable under the Clean Water
Act, which would provide him immunity from retaliation).
203. See Rustad, supra note 9, at 481–82 (highlighting the measures taken by computer
hackers to preserve anonymity, including “false email headers, offshore sites, and anonymous
e-mailers”).
204. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a), (g) (2006) (basing the defendant’s penalty on his level of
culpability).
205. Virginia G. Maurer & Ralph E. Maurer, Rethinking Compliance Settlements and the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (2012) (unpublished paper) (on file with author) (discussing the
prevalence of DOJ settlements in relation to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
206. Id.
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enforcement agency such as the FBI207 will help to alleviate the problems
caused by companies failing to report suspected trade secret theft.208
The proposed amendment also protects whistleblowers who comply with the
statute’s disclosure requirement from retaliation by their employers. Likewise,
if an individual within an organization has knowledge that another individual
within the organization has violated the amendment by failing to report a
suspected trade secret theft, he may alert law enforcement with immunity from
retaliation by the organization. Immunity under the amendment is afforded by
the existing federal obstruction of justice statute, which states that:
Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action
harmful to any person, including interference with the lawful
employment or livelihood of any person, for providing to a law
enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the
commission or possible commission of any Federal offense, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or
both.209
The proposed amendment will also improve data security practice among
organizations that develop the affected technologies. Most companies go to
great lengths to avoid prosecuting trade secret thefts because of the burdens
imposed by the EEA.210 The proposed amendment provides government
enforcement and prosecuting agencies with the opportunity to prosecute
previously unreported theft, which in turn will help to improve data security.
Increased prosecution of the EEA will signal that lax security practices will
likely lead to sanctions under the amendment.211 To avoid the difficulties
associated with prosecuting trade secret theft under the EEA, companies will
be more willing to increase security to avoid reporting suspected trade secret
theft in the first place.

207. Counterintelligence efforts to protect U.S. economic interests are the FBI’s second
priority, after terrorism. Counterintelligence: Economic Espionage, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/counterintelligence/economic
-espionage (last visited Sept. 8, 2013). To achieve this high priority, the FBI has a dedicated
Economic Espionage Unit. Id.
208. See supra Part II and accompanying text (discussing the under-enforcement of trade
secret laws).
209. 18 U.S.C. 1513(e) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
210. See supra notes 106–109 and accompanying text (detailing the difficulties in litigating a
claim under the EEA).
211. Given the close nexus between employment, American competitiveness and trade
secrets, the political climate has been receptive to greater trade secret enforcement actions. See,
e.g., Press Release, Department of Justice, Department of Justice Joins in Launch of
Administration’s Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property Enforcement as Part of Ongoing IP
Initiative (June 22, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-ag-722.html.
(reporting that the DOJ has increased efforts and resources to prosecute trade secret cases in
response to the Obama Administration’s first-ever Joint Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property
Enforcement, which resulted in a new DOJ Task Force on Intellectual Property).
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In sum, organizations would have an additional and powerful incentive to
create programs to encourage compliance with the amendment’s reporting
requirement.212 Entities that develop technologies relevant to national security
would implement more robust network security programs and better human
resource practices in order to safeguard trade secrets and avoid the penalties for
failing to report a breach. Additionally, under the federal sentencing
guidelines, an organization may implement a compliance program that bolsters
data security as part of a settlement agreement with the Department of
Justice.213
V. CONCLUSION
Trade secret law protects the owner of valuable knowledge from
misappropriation of the information by third parties. The current legal regime
is largely designed to protect trade secrets from theft by domestic actors. As a
consequence, the current regime fails to protect many trade secrets that are
stolen by foreign state-sponsored entities. This problem is compounded when
the misappropriated trade secrets involve technologies that affect national
security.
Amending the EEA to mandate disclosure of suspected trade secret thefts
related to any technology that is subject to export restriction would help to
protect information relevant to national security. Mandated disclosure would
help to address the underreporting of foreign trade secret theft, which impedes
the EEA’s goal of deterrence; inspire better trade secret management practices;
protect whistleblowers from retaliation by their employers retaliation; and
encourage cooperation between companies that develop sensitive technologies
and federal law enforcement agencies, which is necessary to safeguard the
nation’s critical infrastructure and knowledge-based assets.

212. A firm’s audit committee and compliance director would appropriately oversee
compliance with this amendment.
213. Maurer & Maurer, supra note 205.
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